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ABSTRACT
EquiliiDriurnand Disequilibrium Fchange Rates
The paper reviews theoretical develorents in the field of exchange
rate theory and assesses the empirical evidence. Since the empirical
evidence does not lend support to the nrdels that have been formulated,
a number of reasons for that failure are suggested. These include
the argument that the current account has been overrated as an
exchange rate determinant and that the role of "news" as yet remains
to be tested in an extensive way.
Four exchange rate problems are identified as possibly giving justification
to exchange market intervention or other policies. They are the possibility
of speculative bubbles, the peso problem, the use of irrelevant information
and the problem of real appreciation in the case of monetarist stabilization.
In each case the exchange rate can deviate fran furidarrentals, following









Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Milton Friedman's 1950 essay "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates"
brought persuasive arguments against exchange control and fixed exchange
rates and established firmly the profession's preference for flexible rates.
The case rested on a triple advantage: no need for direct controls and
inefficiency, the advantage of monetary sovereignity and the convenience of
adjusting the exchange rate rather than the entire domestic price structure.
The analogy with daylight savings time plainly made the case that "it is far
simpler to allow one price to change, namely, the price of foreign exchange,
than to rely upon changes in the multitude of prices that together constitute
the internal price structure."1 When the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system led to flexible rates the profession accepted this as progress; that
belief continues and predisposes us to see the experiment with flexible
exchange rates as successful.
It is not always easy to believe that the experiment has been an
outright success. We do observe large, apparently self—reversing movements
in exchange rates, both rioiuinal and real. More importantly, we often have no
good idea, either in theory or more Informally, in what manner the current
level of the exchange rate represents an equilibrium. It is at such times,
• *Fiflaucial support was provided by a grant from The National Science
Foundation. I wish to acknowledge helpful discussions with Olivier
Blanchard, Jeffrey Frankel, Alberto Giovannini, Dale Henderson, Maurice
Obstfeld and Robert Shiller.
1Friedman (1953), p. 173.—2—
of course, that we are reminded of the history of flexible exchange rates in
the 1920s, especially the French episode, and the argument of the time that
exchange rates were moved, under the influence of speculation, in ways
incompatible with fundamentals and aggravating the problems of domestic
stabilization. That view had been advanced by Nurkse (1944, p. 118):
• "...anticipations are apt to bring about their own realization.
Anticipatory purchases of foreign exchange tend to produce or at
any rate to hasten the anticipated fall in the exchange value of
the national currency, and the actual fall may set up or strenthen
expectations of a further fall.... Exchange rates in such
circumstances are bound to become highly unstable, and the
influence of psychological factors may at times be overwhelming.
French economists were so much impressed by this experience that
they developed a special 'psychological theory' of exchange
fluctuations, stressing the indetertainant character of exchange
rates when left to find their own level in a market swayed by
speculative anticipations." (p. 118.)
Nurkse's view was challenged by Friedman (1953, pp. 176—77) who
argued that no professional case had been made to the effect that speculation
was destabilizing. On the contrary, speculation against the currency only
anticipated a depreciation bound to come of its own. That criticism has been
largely endorsed by the profession and ratified in exchange rate models where
the current equilibrium exchange rate correctly reflects the anticipated path
of future (exogeneous) money. The exchange rate then is merely a barometer
of a government's inflationary intentions.
But such an interpretation misses an important point in Nurkse's
interpretation, namely, that there is an exchange rate indeternilnancy because
financial policies, which supposedly anchor the system, are in fact
endogeneous and may be substantially caused by movements in the exchange
rate. It is true that the exchange rate only reflects the possible paths the—3—
economy might take. But the likelihood of a particularly adverse path
becomes higher once speculators' recognition of that possibility is reflected
in the exchange rate and, from there, in prices and the requirements of
monetary accommodation. This, of course, was very much the scenario that
Nurkse was commenting on in pre—Poincare France.
The possibility that flexible rates may adversely affect the
macroeconomy is certainly coming to be recognized. The idea of "virtuous and
vicious circles" makes that point, as does the notion that flexible rates
make the Phillips Curve steeper.2 But while it is certainly recognized that
flexible exchange rates may not do their work, this is not yet a commonly
shared belief. Indeed, it is only the controversy over sterling in 1979/80,
the Yen in 1978/79 and the current controversy over the dollar that loudly
suggest a fundamental problem with our exchange rate system.3
In fact there appear to be several separate problems. One emerges
from international real interest differentials that arise in the course of
monetary stabilization which lead to real appreciation and disruptive
macroeconomic effects abroad. A second is associated with speculative
bubbles that remove the exchange rate from a path dictated by fundamentals.
In either event the exchange rate assumes a life of its own that may be
seriously at odds with macroeconomic stability and that calls for remedies.
This is also the case when extraneous beliefs join fundamentals in
influencing the market rate.
There is certainly one thing the experience with flexible rates has
done and that is to disillusion even the true believer on the subject of
monetary sovereignity under flexible rates. That there is no sovereignity
2See Gray and Wallich (1979) and Dornbusch and Krugman (1977).
3See Appendix 6 to the Treasury and Civil Service Report on Monetary
Policy, U.K. House of Commons, London, 1981.—4—
but rather sharp conflict of interest is brought out by the present dollar
problem.
The Financial Times of January 26, 1982 in a commentary entitled "$
Riseunaermines European Bid to cut interest rates" notes:
"The fresh wave of higher U. S. interest rates threatens
to wreck the independent initiative launched last week by the
Bank of England, the West German Bundesbank and other EEC
central banks to lower the cost of credit in Europe and speed
up economic recovery.
The sharp fall in sterling and other leading European
currencies against the dollar yesterday may prolong the
European recession just as an upturn had seemed likely.
This is because EEC central banks may be forced to take
action to prevent currency depreciation triggering off fresh
inflation."
That these concerns go beyond technicalities of day—to—day money
markets is represented in a follow—up article on January 28th: "Germans
worried by U. S. deficit" which notes:
"However, despite the efforts of European central banks to
coordinate a modest fall in interest rates. last week, it is
stressed here that Europe's scope to "uncouple itself from
U. S. developments remains very small. This is said to apply
to West Germany despite its improved current account performance
and relatively low inflation rate.
Bonn feels that the upshot may well be a further fall in
investment, a rise in unemployment and more social unrest. "All
elements of a depression are there," one official stressed.
This paper will take the perspective that exchange rates in the 1970s
have not worked well. From that point of view, we attempt to establish in
what ways the exchange rate system may have fallen short of what theory and—5—
policy beliefs suggest and what possible remedies there are. In the first
section exchange rate theories and some empirical evidence are reviewed. The
section concludes that theories have across the board failed to account for
exchang'e rate behavior. The next section identifies four specific policy
problems: bubbles, the peso—problem, extraneous beliefs and the dollar
problem. Each deals with the possibility of disequilibrium exchange rates,
although in different, possibly overlapping ways. The last section discusses
(and dismisses) intervention as a policy tool and makes a case for real
interest equalization taxes.
1. Exchange Rate Theories
This section develops the main theoretical approaches to exchange rate
determination and comments cursorily on their empirical success. The
relevant theories are tha monetary approach and the current account
approaches in two variants emphasizing imperfect substitutability of assets
and goods respectively.
The Monetary Approach
The monetary approach, no doubt, is the most popular model of
exchange rate determination, anchored as it is in two outrageous simplifica—
tions of the economic scene: purchasing power parity and the quantity
theory. The model assumes that national price levels are instantaneously
flexible and determined by money supplies and real money demands. Moreover,
with the "law of one price" prices are equalized internationally with
exchange rate movements offsetting divergent national price trends,—6—
The monetary approach gives rise to an exchange rate equation that
includes relative nominal money supplies, relative velocities and relative
levels of real income. In log form the exchange rate equation then becomes:
(1) enrm* + (v_v*) —(y_y*)
where e is the dollar price of foreign exchange and m,v,y are nominal money,
velocity and real income, an asterix denoting the foreign country. Early
endeavors with this equation were not unsuccessful, but by now there are, I
believe, no more serious claims for the empirical relevance of this model.
The Terms of Trade Model.
The monetary model is highly restrictive in its assumption of the law
of one price. This is apparent when we move to a transactions version of
this model. Suppose q denotes the log of the expenditure deflator, a, is
real spending and v now denotes the expenditure velocity. Home money market
equilibrium can be stated in terms of the determinants of the expenditure
deflator:
(2) qp+v—a
where q is a weighted average of home and import prices:
For reference see, for example, Dornbusch (1980). See, however, the
discussion in the Economic Report of the President, 1982.—7—
(3) qxp + (l—x) (e+p*)
With a similar specification for the foreign country, and assuming foreign
expenditure on domestic goods to have a share x < x, we derive an exchange
rate equation of the form:
(4) e =[(m_m*)÷(v_v*)—(a_a*)]+ (x_x*)e
where ee+p*_p denotes the terms of trade.
The extended model maintains the prediction of the monetary approach
to the extent that changes in money or velocity are translated into
equiproportionate 4epreciation, given the terms of trade. But now there is
another source of exchange rate movement, namely, terms of trade changes.
Changes in the equilibrium terms of trade affect the equilibrium exchange
rate to an extent that depends, among other factors, on the differential in
expenditure shares, x-x.
The extended model is readily applied, in the manner of Fleming and
Mundell, to the effects of a shift in demand toward domestic goods. Suppose
capital is perfectly mobile., and that the home country faces a given,
unchanging foreign level of spending and interest rates. Assume also that
product prices are given. Figure 1 shows the determination of the exchange
rate at point A. The IS schedule is positively sloped because a real
depreciation creates demand and raises output. The LM schedule is negatively









stock thus making room for a real expansion. Figure 1 shows that a shift in
demand toward domestic goods will raise income and lead to an appreciation.
The expansion will be larger the larger the share of importables in the
deflator. By contrast, a large import share in the expenditure deflator will
tend to dampen the expansionary impact of a money expansion.
Even before we move to issues of imperfect asset substitution or
expectations, exchange rate determination is already a macroeconomic problem
involving the interaction of goods and asset markets. Consider now the
extension to the case where output adjusts gradually to long—run excess
demand and exchange rate expectations conform to perfect foresight. Under
the assumption that capital mobility is perfect, home nominal Interest rates
equal those abroad plus the anticipated rat of depreciation:
(5)
In Figure 2, we show the phase diagram, noting that now the rate of
depreciation ,Isa determinant of home velocity. From an initial
equilibrium at A a monetary expansion leads to an immediate depreciation at
point A' on the saddlepath. The exchange rate in the short run must
overshoot as output expansion is sluggish. At A' the exchange rate has over—
depreciated and thus anticipated appreciation lowers velocity relative to a
static expectations world. Over time the economy converges to point A as
output expands to meet the increase in demand. The economy proceeds from A'
to A' along the perfect foresight path PP.
The analysis of expectations is readily extended in three directions.
One is to add sluggish price adjustment and thus allow long run neutrality.








Third, and perhaps most important, we can introduce an explicit consideration
of the current account as a source of dynamics. Current account imbalances,
by redistributing net assets internationally, may affect demand to the extent
that marginal spending patterns differ. If this is the case, current account
imbalances lead to changes in equilibrium relative prices and thus to changes
in the exchange rate.
We have reached the point where the current exchange rate is
determined not only by current monetary factors——the relative supply and
demand of money——but also by prospective monetary factors as well as the
present and future demand for goods. An anticipated fiscal expansion, for
example, will lead to immediate currency appreciation even though the demand
expansion has, as yet, not materialized. But there is one important
conplication still left out, namely, the possibility of imperfect
substitution among assets.
perfect Asset Substitutability
If asset holders are risk averse, and returns on securities
denominated in different currencies are not perfectly correlated, risk premia
may emerge that depend on relative asset supplies.
A risk premium modifies the relation between interest rates and
expected depreciation In (5). The equation now becomes:
(6) i =i*+ + (B/ ,w/w)l > O 2 0
where B denotes the supply of domestic outside nominal assets while W and W'
are home wealth and world wealth all measured in home currency. The extent—10—
to which the risk premium increases with a rise in the relative supply of
domestic currency assets depends on the degree of risk aversion and the
variance of relative asset returns. The exchange rate affects the variables
B/W and wIW since it influences the domestic currency value of world wealth.
A depreciation lowers the relative supply of domestic assets and domestic
relative wealth.
The risk premium model of asset markets, in conjunction with money and
goods markets, extends the range of exchange rate determinants which now
include the current and prospective relative supplies of nominal outside
assets and, possibly, the distribution of world wealth. It is interesting to
note, in this context, that imperfect asset substitutability need, by no
means, establish a link between current accounts and the exchange rate.
Frankel (1979) among others, has noted that what is at issue in the risk
premium is the relative supply of nominal outside assets. Privately financed
current account imbalances will not affect the world supplies of outside
assets. Furthermore, even if the deficits were publicly financed there is no
necessity that they be financed in terms of home currency denomination. More
importantly, as has been noted, the relative supply of outside nominal assets
is also affected by intervention and budget financing, thus obliterating any
special role for the current account.
There remains the question whether current accounts, by redistributing
world wealth, interact with a preferred domestic habitat in portfolios to
change the risk premium and therefore, affect exchange rates. As Krugman
(1980) has shown this possibility requires a coefficient of risk aversion
larger than unity. Again it must be borne in mind that the relevant measure
of wealth in the risk premium will also include real assets so that there is—11—
typic? no direct relation between the current account alone and the
distribution of world wealth. A stock market boom will have much larger
effects on relative wealth than likely current account imbalances.
Empirical Evidence
Claims for empirically successful exchange rate equations are
disappearing rapidly. Recent papers by Frankel (1982), Isard (1981), Rogoff
and Meese (1981) and Hacche and Townsend (1981) all conclude that
structural models of exchange rate determination all fail to account well for
actual exchange rate behavior. This is the case whether a monetary approach
is adopted, a Mundell—Fleining—Frankel model or models that include, in
addition, current account or relative wealth variables.
Hacche and Townsend (1981, p. 253) summarize their findings as
follows:
"The predominant impresion left by our results is one
of failure: we have not succeeded in finding empirical
regularities in the data to help explain in any satisfac—
tory way the fundamental determinants of sterling's effect-
ive exchange rate during the floating rate period. Our
research has failed, often dramatically to yield support
for any of the theories tested...."
The same conclusion is reached by Meese and Rogoff (1981, P. 23) who
conclude:
"major bilateral exchange rates and the trade weighted dollar
are all well approximated by a random walk. The representative
structural models do not perform well out—of—sample; they
predict poorly even when uncertainty about future values of the
explanatory variables is removed."
Isard (1981) and Artus (1982) similarly find that their tests are
unsatisfactory except with the inclusion of a Reagan—dummy.—12—
There are some reasons why the tests may be fairing poorly. First the
models tend to give too much emphasis to money supply disturbances neglecting
shifts in money demand, fiscal and demand disturbances which, of course, are
as impotant as money supply changes. The neglect of demand and fiscal
variables in empirical work is, in fact, quite complete.
The more important point is that exchange rate testing has given no
room to the role of anticipated future events. But it should be clear that
when major changes in the determinants of exchange rates are anticipated they
must affect the level of the exchange rate, given current values of the
exchange rate determinants. This point is readily made with the help of
Figure 3. The economy sits initially at point A and the expectation of a
future increase in money and government spending, respectively, occur. The.
exchange rate will immediately jump in response to the news. In response to
an anticipated future money increase it will depreciate to A', in response to
anticipated higher spending or tax cuts it will appreciate to A".5 Thus
given current money and fiscal policy, today's exchange rate may be any of
three, A, A' or A" depending upon whether we anticipate easier money or
easier fiscal policy or neither. Neglecting these "news" effects on exciange
rates may thus eliminate most of the explanatory variables for the observed
noise. This is more likely to be the case the more proximate and larger the
anticipated changes.
The same point can be made, using the equation for the relationship
between interest differentials, depreciation and the risk premium. Noting
that in (6)denotes the expected rate we can write:6
(7) actua1 = +4(B/W,W/W) + "news"
5Wilson (1977) and Rogoff (1979) have studied the role of anticipated
future disturbances in exchange rate dynamics.













where we have used the fact that with rational expectations the actual
depreciation rate is equal to the expected rate plus a white noise error or
"news." Equation (7) singles Out news as one of the determinants of
movements in the exchange rate. Given current income, money and prices as
well as the relative supplies of assets, the exchange rate may appreciate or
depreciate because the expectation of a change in exchange rate determinants
emerges. While that idea has been immediately accepted in the literature and
indeed, reminds us of the l920s discussion, it has received practically no
empirical testing.7
The literature differs sharply from the extensive and careful testing
which expectations based macroeconomics has received in closed economy
applications. Research here has particularly focussed on questions that run
quite parallel: the effect of money, unanticipated versus anticipated, on
unemployment and the real rate of interest.8 It remains a question whether
the very poor empirical performance of exchange rate models is due to a
failure to distinguish news and anticipated realizations of the determinants
of exchange rates. The work on anticipated future disturbances on the time
path of exchange rates, for example, has amply shown that exchange rates may
well lead anticipated money.
7See, however, Black (1972), Frankel (1981), Dornbusch (1980), Engle
and Frankel (1982) and Cornell (1982b).
8For references see Mishkin (1982).—14—
2. Four Problems
In this section, we sketch four problems that may have arisen under
the flexible exchange rate regime of the 1970s. The first is the adverse
side efect of inappropriate monetary—fiscal policy mixes. The second
concerns the role of expectations about future policy changes that render
current policy more difficult, a variant of the peso problem. The third
concerns the possibility of speculative bubbles. The fourth involves
extraneous beliefs.
Bubbles
Important research on the volatility of asset prices has forced the
question whether asset prices move "too much" given the path of fundamentals
such as interest rates or dividends. (See, for example, Grossman and
Shiller (1980).) The same question arises in the context of exchange rates.
Observing real exchange rates in Chart 1, where we show the Yen and DM
rates, we might ask whether this large movement in real exchange rates is
warranted by beliefs about the fundamental determinants of exchange rates.
Work by Blanchard (1980), Blanchard and Watson (1982) andTirole
(1980) among others discusses the conditions under which speculative bubbles
or cumulative divergences from the path warranted by fundamentals may arise.
An interesting model is that of Blanchard (1980) where risk neutral
speculators are aware that a particular asset price is off the path of
fundamentals. Indeed, they expect with probability a a crash and probability
1—a the continuation of the bubble.
Suppose domestic and foreign assets are perfect substitutes. The
interest rate differential must equal the expected rate of depreciation:CHART 1
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(8) =
where is the expected future exchange rate. But given the
probabilities a associated with a craéh to the fundamental rate, eand 1 —a
of a continuing bubble, we have:
i1 a —
(8a) e+1—e =1+ —(e—e)
Equation (8a) describes a "rational" bubble. The exchange rate in the
absence of a crash depreciates at a rate determined by three factors: the
interest differential, the probability of a crash and the undervaluation,
e—e. The more undervalued the exchange rateand the higher the probability
of a crash the more rapid the rate of depreciation. A positive interest
differential implies depreciation, more so the higher the probability of a
crash.
Leaving aside interest differentials, the equation shows the
fundamental problem of bubbles: the more overvalued the exchange rate the
more rapidly it is reciating, the more undervalued the more rapidly the
rate is preciating. Bubbles are not self—correcting except by a crash.
Bubbles, while they last, involve the possibility of temporary, cumulative
deviations from fundamentals.
The presence of interest differentials introduces the possibility
that the exchange rate can remain unchanged even though there is over or
undervaluation. From (Ba) we have the special case where the exchange rate
remains constant:
(9) —e (j_j*)/a—16—
Thus a positive interest differential in favor of the home country can
sustain an overvaluation while a negative interest differential can sustain
an undervaluation.9 The bubble will be larger the larger the interest
differential and the probability of a crash. For example, a 20% probability
of a crash and a five percentage point interest differential sustain a25%
overvaluation!
The analysis has shown the possibility of temporary deviations of the
exchange rate from the fundamental rate warranted by "the" model or
fundamentals. Why should we be concerned about such deviations? The
obvious reason is that given the path of policy variables an exchange rate
bubble will have real effects on competiveness, inflation, and employment.
It represents a macro—shock that, if possible, we would want to offset. The
possibility of rational bubbles is important to recognize because it
represents a fundamental departure from the view that markets do things
right, all the time.
The Peso Problem
In the case of a bubble, all market participants are aware that the
current exchange rate deviates from the fundamental rate, but the bubble may
be sustained by new entrants and the belief that it may grow fast enough,
thus providing existing asset holders with a commensurate return. A
different kind of exchange rate problem emerges when expectations about the
path of fundamentals affect the current level of the exchange rate. Such a
possibility, particularly when it involves the consideration of a large
change in policy regime, has an effect on the current exchange rate and,
therefore, on the difficulty of macroeconomic management. Specifically, the
expectation of expansionary policy (whether justified or not) will lead to
91n (8a) and (9) the fundamental rate e is constant. In a more
complete model the question must be raised whether this is consistent with
nominal interest differentials.—17—
current actual depreciation and thus to current inflationary pressuresahead
of any expansion. Conversely, the belief in tightening will lead to
appreciation and deflationary pressure.
This is the so—called "peso—problem."1° Salant and Henderson (1976)
have shown that it is a generic problem of asset markets where speculators
have to recognize the possibility of a future change in regime that affects
future asset prices. The point is illustrated with a simple log—linear
monetary model of the exchange rate in the tradition oLMussa(1975).
Suppose there is full purchasing power parity and price flexibilityand that
real money demand depends on expected inflation or depreciation:
(10) m_e_bCt+i_et)
Suppose also that next period and ever thereafter the money stock is with
probability (i—a) current in and with probability a equal to+ x. The
forward solution to (10) yields a level of the current exchange rate:
b
(11) em+i÷bax
Thus the higher the probability of an increase in future money the higher is
the current equilibrium exchange rate.
The problem raised here is very much like that of a bubble if the
contingencies contemplated by the public are not in fact the intention of
policyniakers. The rate today is off the equilibrium path that policymakers
have in mind for the economy. But there is, of course, the possibility that
10See Lizondo (1979) and Krasker (1980).-18—
the fact of a depreciation, due to the beliefs about the possibility of an
expansion, will force the actual expansion. Policies are rarely exogeneous
and they may be largely or entirely endogeneous. If this were the case, then
random variations in beliefs about future policies can shape actual policies
and the economy is without anchor.
There is a sense in which the exchange rate, in this setting, behaves
exactly right. Asset holders are concerned about the possibility of capital
losses and in response to reassessments about the path of policies, they
shift their portfolios and thus move the exchange rate. But there is also a
sense in which this forward—looking, asset market—oriented adjustment of
exchange rates works with an overkill. By adjusting to the whims and fears
of the moment, the exchange rate moves, and possibly a lot, and it moves
relative to other more stable or sticky prices. Thus the real exchange rate,
which guides the international division of labor, is being moved in response
to conjectures about the future course of monetary and fiscal policies.
The importance of the Peso—problem is well—illustrated by the French
experience in 1925—26. While the actual budget was in surplus and inflation
was under control, the expectation that debt service should possibly be
financed by money creation or capital taxation led to a flight out of the
Franc. Chart 2 shows the Franc exchange rate collapsing in early 1926 and
then, upon Poincare's assuming office with fiscal dictatorial powers, rapidly
appreciating again.
The exchange rate links asset and goods market in a sticky price
world. The double allegiance creates trouble because the exchange rate moves
like an asset price and not as a real exchange rate should. But movements in-18a-
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the nominal exchange rate also affect the price level, through import prices,
wages and competitive effects. Thereforemovements in exchange rates,
provoked by changing expectations about policy,have immediate effects on
inflation. The moment the public comes to believe that a particularanti—
inflation program is less likely to succeed, the ensuing exchangerate
depreciation will make that a fact. Clearly here weface the unusual problem
of a price that may be too flexible.
Extraneous Beliefs
There is another manner in which the public's perception of theworld
can lead the exchange rate to deviate fromfundamentals. This arises when
extraneous beliefs about the determinants of asset prices,via expectations,
actually come to influence asset price. This point hasbeen made by
Blanchard (1976) in respect to the Phillips curve and by Shiller (1981) in
the context of the stock market. If fads, fashions or misperceptions are
highly autocorrelated asset prices can persistently and(in finite samples)
undiscoverably deviate from fundamentals. The same point can be easily
demonstrated in the context of exchange rates.
Suppose the model of the exchange rate is in fact (10) butthat market
participants believe the exchange rate is influenced byboth the money supply
and the current account,
(12) =Em÷1 ÷E(C1)
where the actual current account follows a first—order autoregressive process
and the money stock is a constant, m, plus white noise:—20—
(13) Ct =OC_1+ u 'm+in + v1 0 < 9 < 1
with u and v white noise. Using (12) and (13) we arrive at the equilibrium
exchange rate:
(14) e =in +kC ÷v' ,kbe/(1+b) ,v'=v/(1+b)
Accordingly, the current account does affect the equilibrium exchange rate
even though it is not part of the structural model. Note next that the




If the autocorrelation of the current account is high so that 9 is close to
unity and if the response of money demand to the alternative cost of holding
money b, is high, eb/(1+b) is close to unity and the coefficient of C is
close to zero. Regressions will not uncover that forecast errors are
predictable on the basis of the current account. They cannot reject, except
in extremely large samples, the hypothesis that the forecast errors are white
noise.
The example is of interest because it suggests that extraneous beliefs
about exchange rate determinants may introduce persistent and large
deviations of the exchange rate from fundamentals and that these deviations
are undetectable. The full rational expectations exchange rate (setting=
0)would be e =v'+ inandtherefore the deviation from this "fundamentals—21—
rate," e, is equal to kCt. The variance of thefundamentals rate is s =
whereasthe asymptotic variance of the rate including currentaccount
beliefs is:
2 2 22 2
(16) s =s,+k s /(1—8 )
ev u
It is immediately apparent that with 8 close to unity extraneouscurrent
account beliefs introduce a potentially vast variabilityin the exchange
rate.
The Dollar Problem
Since mid 1980, the US dollar has appreciated relative toother
currencies and the real exchange rate today is substantiallyabove the levels
of 1973 or 1975. Chart 3 shows the movement of thereal exchange rate
(relative value added deflators) and also shows thelevel of US real interest
rates. It is apparent that the real depreciationcoincided with a move
toward positive and higher average real rates."
Theoretical models built around the idea of sticky prices or inflation
rates suggest that a tightening in monetary growth, other thingsequal, will
lead to an immediate appreciation of the real exchange rate in responseto
higher domestic interest rates and resulting portfolioshifts in favor of
domestic assets. But unless there is an ongoing tightening,the move toward
tighter money should rapidly translate into fallingnominal interest rates
and a reduction in inflation. In that adjustment process, the exchangerate
would be preciating (following the initial jump appreciation) at a rate
isthe "Reagan—dummy" referred to above.CHART 3 THEUSREALEXCHANGE RATE AND THE REAL
INTEREST RATE
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that matches interest differentials adjusted for risk premia. Over the
medium term there would be no appreciable change in the real interest rate.
Events, in a number of ways, do not fit the theoretical model. On one
side there is an accompanying fiscal expansion which both in the short run
and in the long run will tend to raise real interest rates. That Increase in
real interest rates in turn may have a long run effect on the equilibrium
exchange rate while reinforcing the short run portfolio shifts. On the other
hand, the experiment of monetary tightening is very much in the nature of the
"peso problem" that was discussed above. Continuing nominal and real
appreciation arises as the public reevaluates its belief in tight money in
the light of continuing Fed performance while the Fed itself assesses its
course in the light of performance and approval. Thus monetary tightening is
itself a medium—term exercise in which progressive tightening interacts with
resolve to keep up and belief that this will be the case. The mix allows the
possibility of continuing real appreciation over a two or three year period,
the more so if inflation is sticky.
Monetary stabilization, certainly in combination with fiscal
expansion, cannot fail to raise the real interest rate in the short run and
therefore, to lead to international portfolio re—shuffling in favor of the
dollar. The portfolio shifts, in turn, induce currency appreciation both in
real and in nominal terms. That appreciation, which is an international side
effect of our domestic stabilization policies, is a serious macroeconomic
problem as the following evidence shows.—23—
Table 1 shows estimates by the Federal Reserve, using their multi—
country trade and payments model, of the 20% dollar appreciation on a trade
weighted basis, on growth and Inflation.
Table I













Germany 1.6 1.4 .7 .3 2.4 2.1
US —0.4 —0.5 —0.1 —.5—0.4 1.1
Source: Hooper (1982).
The OECD has also reported estimates of the effects of exchange rate
changes in their multilateral model. Here the effects of a 10% dollar
preciation are studied, with the depreciation occurring at the outset.—24—
Table 2
OECD Estimate of the Effects of a 10% Dollar Depreciation


















North America 0.40.70.30.1 —0.20.10.40.3
Europe —0.5—0.1—0.6-0.3 0.0—0.2—0.4—0.3
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, December 1981, pp. 124—125.
The simulations of either model bring out clearly that exchange rates
have a very strong impact on inflation and that they also affect real
acitivity. A dollar preciation will reduce US inflation and raise
inflation in Europe. Either model suggests that within a year, a 20% dollar
appreciation would raise the European price level about 3% above what it
would otherwise be. That is a very large inflation shock; it certainly is of
the same order as the oil price shock. The inflationary shock is
particularly large when there is comprehensive indexation that translates
higher import prices into increased unit labor costs and thus speeds
comprehensively through the economy.
The inflation shock Is accompanied by a change in real GNP growth made
up of two opposing tendencies. The terms of trade deterioration in Europe
lowers real GNP directly. But there Is an offset due to increased—25—
competitiveness that increases trade volume. Both sets of estimates show
that ultimately the gain in competitiveness increases growth of real GNP, and
quite strongly so in the Federal Reserve model. The OECD model, by contrast,
shows both slower and smaller responses of growth.
Now it must be recognized that Europe can expand aggregate demand and
raise growth, should she wish to do so. We can therefore not count the
growth benefits of the dollar appreciation as an important offset against the
imported inflation. In fact, what we must assume is that Europe in an
attempt to contain inflation——after all, that is what every country is trying
hard to do——must spend the gain in growth and quite a bit more to confine or
offset the inflationary impact. This implies not only a reduction in growth
but quite possibly too an environment less hospitable to investment. On
balance then the dollar appreciation represents an adverse supply shock for
Europe. There remains some scope for Europe to affect the composition of the
shock between inflation and recession or reduced growth.
In the US, the exchange rate appreciation exerts a favorable effect on
inflation, although the effect is small compared to those in Europe. The
impact on growth is negative but small. It is apparent, therefore, that the
US interests and those of other counties are sharply opposed. What to the US
is a favorable side effect to tight money represents an adverse effect
abroad. The question then must be whether these spill—over effects are part
and parcel of a well functioning exchange rate system or whether they
represent an important shortcoming that needs serious consideration and
remedy.
There is another respect in which US policies, and the changed policy
envIronment, contribute to instability. Engle and Frankel (1982) report that—. —
moneysurprises——deviations of the Friday release of money data from
forecasts——exert a significant effect on short term interest rates and on
exchange rates. Cornell (1982) reports the astounding fact that these money
news move not only the very short term rate, as might be expected when Fed
correction of money is anticipated, but also the whole maturity structure up
to 30 years bonds. The fact that the entire interest rate structure moves up
in response to weekly money forecast errors reflects the fact that
expectations about long term rates have become very diffuse and that now the
short term is more nearly thought of as a random walk. In such a world
volatility of interest rates may well bring about larger volatility of
exchange rates.
3. What is to be Done?
We have identified several problems that place in question the
effective operation of the flexible exchange rate system. All issues arise
because exchange rates are and behave like asset prices but do play an
important role in goods markets as well. We now have to ask whether there
are policy remedies to these problems and whether the possible remedies are
cost effective. It is important to say at the outset that these issues are
unresolved.
There are two possible avenues for Influencing and controlling the
behavior of exchange rates: one is (sterilized) intervention, the other is a
real interest equalization tax (RIET). The case for intervention has been
andisan uncomfortable one. The case for a RIET Is, at first sight, more
controversial, but is an avenue that in view of North Atlantic discord and
disruption becomes increasingly realistic as an option.—27—
Intervention
The case for intervention rests on the premise that domestic and
foreign currency securities are imperfect substitutes and that, accordingly,
changes in their relative supplies will induce portfolio disequilibria. At
going interest rates there is a pressure for exchange rate adjustments and
these adjustment in turn spread to other financial markets as well as to the
goods markets. It is thus possible, on the premise of imperfect asset
substitutability, to influence exchange rates by affecting the relative
supplies of home and foreign currency outside securities or by management of
the currency composition of world debt.
Henderson (1982) offers a definitive analysis of the case for
intervention. He concludes that intervention is optimal (if feasible) in the
case of portfolio shifts, which of course is the traditional case for
accommodating financial policies. For disturbances to aggregate demand, by
contrast, a policy of maintaining non—interventionn in money and exchange
markets offers greater employment stability. The latter point is readily
made with standard aggregate demand and supply schedules as shown in Figure
4. The money wage is assumed fixed but prices are flexible. Thus there is
an upward sloping aggregate supply A. The aggregate demand schedule Ad,
embodies bond and money market equilibrium, given the alternative policy
assumptions. Along the steeper schedule exchange and interest rates are held
constant. Therefore, a decline in prices stimulates aggregate demand only
through the effect on competitiveness. Along the dashed and flatter
aggregate demand schedule money and debt are held constant. Therefore, a
fall in prices lowers interest rates and expands demand while at the same
time, for bond markets to clear, it induces a depreciation and thus—28—
reinforces the gain in competitiveness. Accordingly, a larger rise in output
is required to restore balance.
A given autonomous increase in demand shifts the aggregate demand
scheduThs Out and to the right, the more so the more accommodating are
policies. If interest rates and exchange rates are held constant, the demand
expansion is not dampened by higher interest rates and appreciation.
Accordingly, under such a "rates constant" policy as Henderson concludes,
demand disturbances have a larger impact on employment and domestic prices
(point B") than is the case for an aggregate policy (point B'). There are
significant complications to the model once we allow, as we should, supply
side effects of exchange rate movements. Once these complications are
introduced it becomes much less clearcut whether rates constant policies are
preferred to policies that maintain aggregates. It also becomes more
difficult to identify what is the disturbance that is affecting the economy.
On both counts the case for an active intervention stance becomes less
clearcut, except for obvious portfolio shifts.
The ambiguity in the assessment of intervention is increased once we
consider the imperfect substitution issue. There is, of course, rio question
that dollar and foreign currency assets are imperfect substitutes. This is
the case because their returns are not perfectly correlated and in some cases
are, in fact, negatively correlated. But there remains the question whether
the variance of relative returns and the degree of risk aversion are
sufficiently large to make imperfect substitutes an easy policy channel.
Long and short bonds are imperfect substitutes but twisting the term
structure through debt management never was a success. The same question—29—
arises in the exchange rate context: how large an intervention is required
to move the $/DM rate 1%? To that question we have no serious answer.
If intervention does not look like a very reliable tool, are there any
options? One option is a (moving) wide exchange rate band within which rates
are flexible but at the margins of which rates would bedefended. Such a
band might be reasonable as a proposition to eliminate extreme risk. But in
doing so we may also increase the mobility of capital and actually aggravate
exchange rate instability within the band. The only sense of a bandwould be
as a cooperative venture in forestalling disruptive policies to spill over
into excessive appreciation or depreciation. But it is also conceivable that
such band setting may well assume protectionist overtones. On balance, there
are serious doubts about such a policy.
The case for intervention is usually made as one of countering
disorderly market conditions.12 But there is no very good case why small
noise in the market should be smoothed, and there is good reason that large
noise cannot effectively be dealt with. A massive disturbance such as the
dollar appreciation of 1980-82 probably cannot be dealt with by intervention,
unless we allow the exchange authorities to have swings in the size and
denomination of their assets. For such massive disturbances we need a more
adequate tool.
Real Interest Equalization Taxes
History is aplenty with collapse and surges in exchange rates, whether
we look at France in the 1920s, the US in the last years, or the laboratory
experiments in Latin America. Invariably, the really vast changes inreal
exchange rates are associated not with changes in comparative advantage but
rather with the medium-term adjustment to abandon of fiscal control or, on
12See Economic Report of the President, 1982, pp. 189—191.—30—
the other side, monetary stabilization. Taking the case of monetary
tightening, real exchange rates easily move by 20 or 40 percentage pointsand
therefore have, of course, vast effects on the economy over and above what
tight ufoney implies. In a small country, these effects are largely domestic,
but when the policy is pursued in the US, unsynchronized with the rest of the
world, then the policy spills over as an adverse disruptive supply shock
abroad. In the trade field, market disruption is dealt with by quotas or ad
hoc compensating duties. This is felt to be an effective policy dealing with
a transitory disturbance. Much the same view should be adopted on capital
account. Whenever unsynchronized policies open up disruptively large real
interest differentials, we need ad hoc real interest equalization taxes that
close the gaps and avoid a major impact on the real exchange rate.13 There
is no sensible argument that tightening of money should involve as a
desirable side effect a loss of exports, an increase in imports, and
international redistribution of real income and borrowing abroad. Because
these side effects are undesirable, both here and abroad, we should attempt
to the maximum possible extent to immunize the world economy against these
spillovers.
Ad hoc duties to offset trade disruption are neither totally efficient
nor totally effective. But nobody questions that they substantially
accomplish their purpose of insulating an industry from some transitory
foreign disturbance. The same applies to an RIET. There is little doubt
that some inefficiency is involved and that certainly more than the case of
trade disruption duties, there is room for circumvention. But that is also
13Tobin (1978) has argued for a permanent tax on foreign currency
transactions. Liviatan (1979) argues for transitory taxes assoicated with
monetary stabilization.—31 & 32—
true for all kinds of taxation and taxes, roughly, do work. But it is also
true that a RIET is a highly desirable, second—best, instrument.
A real interest equalization tax is a second—best instrument in that
at some efficiency costs, it avoids the even larger costs of adverse spill—
over of US policies abroad. The first—best world is one where transition to
lower inflation has no real effects whatsoever, but proceeds with full
employment and constant real interest harmony. The moment that scenario is
disturbed because prices or inflation rates are sticky, there is a
presumption that supplementary policies, both domestic and international,
should accompany tight money. The relevant criterion by which to judge
supplementary policies (tips, wage controls, investment tax credits, RIETs)
is whether on balance they make the economy operate more efficiently without
prejudicing the disinflation target. Surely, that must be the case for RIETs
since they avoid, if effective, the adverse and totally unwarranted effects
of US policies abroad. The argument against RIETs is that they arecostly
since they interfere with the free flow of capital. But that argument is
empty since it fails to demonstrate that the costs of an RIET are larger than
the benefits gained thereby in avoiding the spillover of US policy abroad.
At present, we are spending a percent or more of GNP everyyear to try to
reduce inflation. We cannot seriously argue that the allocational costs of
RIETs are in any sense commensurate with the costs that are avoided by their
preventing imported inflation in Europe.—33—
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